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QUESTIONS OF FACT REGARDING WHETHER A NEW CONTRACT WAS 
FORMED IN 1985 
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sufficient to create an issue of fact as to whether there was a 
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Appellee's contention that the 1985 contract was not reduced 
to writing is i rre] evant as there is nothina L.U indicate that the 
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likewise, Appellee's contention that Appell-mt is making 
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specifically argued that "A NEW CONTRACT WAS FORMED BETWEEN 
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT." 
Finally, at the very least, there is sufficient evidence to 
put to the jury the question of whether a quorum of commissioners 
was present at the January 15, 1985 meeting and either authorized 
or ratified a new contract. 
WHETHER APPELLANT'S RELIANCE WAS REASONABLE IS A QUESTION OF 
FACT FOR THE JURY 
Appellee's arguments that it is "reasonable to conclude" 
(1) that Appellant was aware of the requirements of UCA, §7-5-5; 
and (2) that Mr. Ehlers would not have incurred substantial 
costs without a written contract in 1985, are misplaced. In the 
first place, for purposes of summary judgment, the question is 
not what is reasonable to conclude, but what Appellee has 
established as undisputed facts. More importantly, with respect 
to § 7-5-5, the record shows that the requirements of that 
section were met in this case. With respect to the 
reasonableness of proceeding without a written contract, Appellee 
ignores the fact that it advised Mr. Ehlers that it was very 
important that he get the job done immediately and requested that 
he get the "wheels rolling". The argument also ignores the fact 
that until the commencement of this lawsuit, both Mr. Ehlers and 
Appellee's representatives considered the Tri-Court Complex and 
the Criminal Justice Center to be the same project and, 
accordingly, governed by the 1978 contract. 
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Appellant hereby replies to the Brief of Appellee as 
follows. 
ARGUMENT 
I. RESPONSE TO POINT II 
THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT AS TO WHETHER THE 1978 CONTRACT 
WAS CONCLUDED UPON THE FAILURE OF THE BOND ISSUE 
In Point II of its argument, Appellee contends that: 
Plaintiff's (i.e. Appellant's) testimony provides 
undisputed material facts which substantiate the 
conclusion that . . . the 1978 contract concluded upon 
rejection of the bond issue in the election certified 
on June 15, 1981. 
(See Brief of Appellee at page 8 ) . 
In support of this contention Appellee quotes portions of 
Appellant's deposition testimony. (See Brief of Appellee at 
pages 5-7). Unfortunately, for Appellee, the quoted testimony 
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provides absolutely no support for its position that the 1978 
contract had concluded. To the contrary, said testimony clearly 
bolsters Appellant's position that the 1978 contract was merely 
in a state of suspension as a result of the failed bond issue. 
For example, in response to Appellee's question as to 
whether Appellant was aware that "the project wouldn't go forward 
unless the bond issue passed," Mr. Ehlers testified 
. . . I was aware that it would not go at that time, 
but I was always told and aware that rati some time it 
would move on . . . 
(See Brief of Appellee at page 5 (quoting from Mr. Ehlers' 
deposition at page 60)) (emphasis added). 
Appellee repeated the question two more times and 
Appellant's answers were still that the failure of the bond issue 
only meant that the project would not go forward at that time. 
QUESTION: Is it a fair statement that you knew that 
the project at least at that point would not go forward 
unless the bond issue passed? 
ANSWER: It would not go forward at that time, right. 
QUESTION: When that bond issue back in 1981 was held— 
ANSWER: Right. 
QUESTION: —if that didn't pass then it wouldn't go 
immediately forward? 
ANSWER: That's right." 
(See Brief of Appellee at page 6 (quoting from Mr. Ehlers' 
deposition at page 60)) (emphasis added). 
Obviously, contrary to Appellee's contention, Mr. Ehlers did 
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not "acknowledge [] in his testimony that the contract was 
concluded upon the rejection of the bond issue." (See Brief of 
Appellee at page 5). Mr. Ehlers' testimony makes it very clear 
that he was always told and it was always his understanding that 
the failure of the bond issue was a temporary set back and that 
the project would eventually go forward. Accordingly, there is 
clearly a question of fact as to whether the 1978 contract was 
concluded upon the failure of the bond issue. 
In point of fact, the project did eventually go forward and 
no amount of equivocating by Appellee with regard to which courts 
were to be housed in the project or whether a jail facility or 
commission chambers were to be included in the project can change 
that fact. At best, whether the Criminal Justice Center and the 
Tri-Court Complex were the same project for purposes of this 
contract action is a question of fact for the jury's 
determination. 
Appellee also goes to great length to point out to the Court 
that Mr. Ehlers "acknowledged in his testimony that he was paid 
an amount agreeable to him for the work he performed." (See 
Brief of Appellee at page 6). Of course, this point has nothing 
whatsoever to do with the case at bar because it involves payment 
for services not included in this action. Apparently, Appellee 
believes that it is entitled to "brownie points" because 
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Appellant was satisfied with the payment received for prior 
services. Significantly, however, Appellee also notes that 
Appellant was actually entitled to receive approximately $20,000 
more than he was paid for his prior services, but that the lower 
amount was accepted as an accommodation to Appellee's very tight 
budget. Had Appellee treated Appellant as honorably, this 
lawsuit would not have been necessary. 
II. RESPONSE TO POINT III 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE THERE ARE 
QUESTIONS OF FACT REGARDING WHETHER A NEW CONTRACT WAS 
FORMED IN 1985 
In support of its position that a new contract was not 
formed in 1985, Appellee asserts that (1) there was no meeting 
of the minds sufficient to form a contract; (2) the contract was 
not reduced to writing; (3) Appellant is submitting argument to 
this Court that was not made before the district court; and (4) 
the 1985 contract was not authorized by formal commission action. 
Each of these arguments will be addressed in turn. 
With regard to the argument that there was no meeting of the 
minds between the parties sufficient to form a new contract in 
1985, Mr. Ehlers' deposition testimony makes the following very 
clear: 
(1) That he was contacted by Lee Semken, who at the 
time was Chairman of the Carbon County Commission; and 
that Mr. Semken advised him that the Criminal Justice 
Cent€*r project had been revived as the Tri-Court 
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Complex and was going to go forward as they had 
anticipated it would. 
(See Ehlers deposition at page 61). 
(2) That Mr. Semken, Mr. Ehlers, Floyd Marx and Guido 
Rachiele met together on January 15, 1985 in the Carbon 
County commission chambers and discussed the project 
for approximately three hours. 
(See Ehlers deposition at pages 62-63). 
(3) That Mr. Semken advised Mr. Ehlers that it was 
very important that he get his end of the job done 
immediately; that a six week time frame was agreed to; 
and that Semken told him to get the "wheels rolling." 
(See Ehlers deposition at page 61). 
Thus, at the very least, there was clearly sufficient 
evidence to require a jury determination as to whether there was 
a meeting of the minds sufficient to support a new contract in 
1985. See, e.g. Oberhansky v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384 (Utah 1977). 
Appellee's assertion that the 1985 contract was not reduced 
to writing is irrelevant and requires no further discussion. 
Suffice it to say that there is nothing to indicate that this 
contract was within the statute of frauds. 
Likewise, Appellee's assertion that Appellant is submitting 
argument to this Court not raised before the trial court requires 
very little discussion. Attached to the Brief of Appellant as 
Exhibit "D" is a copy of Plaintiff's Response Memorandum To 
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment at page 3 of which it was 
specifically argued that "A NEW CONTRACT WAS FORMED BETWEEN 
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT." 
5 
Finally, there is, again, at the very least sufficient 
evidence to put the question to a jury as to whether a quorum of 
commissioners was present at the January 15, 1985 meeting and 
either authorized or ratified a new contract. Appellee's 
assertion that the January 15, 1985 meeting was not open to the 
public is irrelevant. 
III. RESPONSE TO POINT IV 
WHETHER APPELLANT'S RELIANCE WAS REASONABLE IS A QUESTION 
OF FACT FOR THE JURY 
Appellee acknowledges that the trend is away from the 
general rule that estoppel is not available against a 
governmental entity, see Utah State University of Agriculture and 
Applied Sciences v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718, FN.4 (Utah 
1982), and that in Utah estoppel may be applied when justice so 
requires. 646 P.2d at 720. 
However, Appellee asserts that estoppel is not available in 
the case at bar because Appellant has had extensive dealings with 
government agencies and "[i]t is certainly reasonable to conclude 
that the plaintiff was aware of the requirements of Utah Code 
Annotated, § 7-5-5, 1987. This is especially true when 
considering Mr. Ehlers' testimony when he said 'of course, we are 
waiting for the final go ahead to start drawing.'" (See Brief of 
Appellee at page 10). 
Whether it is "reasonable to conclude" that Appellant was 
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aware of the requirements of § 7-5-5 is, again, irrelevant to the 
case at bar for two reasons. First, as discussed above, the 
requirements of that section were met in this case (or at least a 
jury would be entitled to so find). Second, even if Mr. Ehlers' 
awareness of § 7-5-5 were an issue on this appeal, the question 
would be whether such awareness had been established by Appellee 
as an undisputed fact, not whether it was a reasonable 
conclusion. See Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Finally, Appellee cites Larsen v. Wycoff, 624 P.2d 1151 
(Utah 1981), for the proposition that the issue of estoppel is 
governed by an objective reasonable person standard and that 
because Appellant prepared a formal contract concerning his 
dealings with Appellee in 1978 "it is reasonable to conclude 
that Mr. Ehlers would not proceed with incurring substantial 
costs without a written contract in 1985." (See Brief of 
Appellee at page 11). 
This argument ignores two important facts. First, Appellee 
had advised Mr. Ehlers that "it was a very important thing that 
we get [the project] done immediately and [Appellee through its 
agent Semken] asked [Mr. Ehlers if he] could handle a time 
schedule of around six weeks." (See Ehlers deposition at page 
61). Second, both Mr. Ehlers and (until the commencement of this 
lawsuit) the representatives of Appellee considered the Tri-Court 
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Complex and the Criminal Justice Center to be the same project 
and, accordingly, to be governed by the 1978 contract. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that the Court take notice 
of the fact that Appellee has not disputed Appellant's version of 
the facts in this case. Appellee could have, but did not, 
present the affidavits of Commissioners Semken, Marx, and 
Rachiele to contradict Appellant's testimony. 
A motion for summary judgment is a harsh measure and for 
that reason the contentions of the party opposing the motion must 
be considered in a light most advantageous to him and all doubts 
resolved in favor of permitting him to go to trial. Controlled 
Receivables Inc. v. Harmon, 413 P.2d 807 (Utah 1966). Appellant 
respectfully submits that the case at bar presents genuine issues 
of fact regarding: 
(1) whether Appellee is estopped from denying it had a 
contract with Appellant; 
(2) whether Appellee's actions revived the 1978 contract; 
and 
(3) whether a new contract was entered into in 1985. 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests 
that the Court reverse the summary judgment granted in favor of 
Appellee and remand this case for a full trial on the merits. 
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Respectfully submitted this // day of , 1990 
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